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SHAFTESBURY'S  
ETHICAL PRINCIPLE

OF  
ADAPTATION TO  
UNIVERSAL HARMONY

*Thesis for Ph. D.*

By  
ALEXANDER LYONS, M.A.

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*To*

**REV. DR. HENRY BERKOWITZ, PHILADELPHIA**

**TO WHOM THE AUTHOR OWES THE BEGINNING OF HIS  
PROFESSIONAL LIFE, THIS MONOGRAPH IS LOVINGLY  
DEDICATED AS A LITTLE TOKEN OF A LARGE  
APPRECIATION**

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## INTRODUCTION

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### I

A. The aim of this thesis will be expository and critical. Its justification lies in the fact that there is need in English of a succinct, clear statement of Shaftesbury's ethical teaching from a comparative critical standpoint. This is especially true with reference to students of ethics to whom other languages than the English are not familiar. Besides, there is not at present in any language a presentation of the subject after the manner to be pursued here.

An appreciation of Shaftesbury must be determined by a comparison of his ethical teaching with that of Hobbes. This is not the usual course. As a rule presentations and discussions of our author take him in and by himself with only incidental reference to Hobbes. This manner of treatment is acceptable if our aim is the expression of a judgment from our standpoint. And yet even this is open to serious objection. It is unfair to judge a writer of the beginning of the eighteenth century by the more advanced standard and culture of the commencement of the twentieth century. We must estimate an author in his historical setting, and more particularly with reference to some standard of his time. Such a criterion in ethical teaching in Shaftesbury's day was furnished by Hobbes from whom subsequent English ethical speculation took its rise.

Shaftesbury's ethical system is diametrically opposed to that of Hobbes, but does not profess any such intention. We have no reason to believe that he intended a refutation of Hobbes. He refers to him several times by implication as when in his discussion, "Concerning Virtue or Merit" (I. 281), he mentions "a known way of reasoning on self-interest," according to which that which is of a social kind in us should of right be abolished. Here, as Robertson, the editor of the *Characteristics* (*Ibid.*), points out, Hobbes is in the mind of our author. A plainer reference to him may be found in the "Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humor"

(*Ibid.*, I., 56), where he says that "some of our most admired modern philosophers had told us, that virtue and vice had, after all, no other law or measure than mere fashion and vogue." Further allusion is made to Hobbes' fundamental doctrine of human selfishness (*Ibid.*, I., 61, 63, 64), where Shaftesbury presents a different conclusion from Hobbes with regard to the proper recourse for man's safety from individual selfishness, but nowhere is Hobbes directly mentioned by way of discussion. This is remarkable. In his "Letters to a Young Man," as will be noticed later, Shaftesbury warns against Locke. He regards Hobbes' philosophy as relieved of its poison by its author's character and base slavish principles of government, and so not needing particular attention. In this Shaftesbury may be said to have erred. In general an author's character does not discredit his philosophy. If Locke appeared to Shaftesbury to call for special mention, Hobbes certainly demanded it the more. This omission may, however, be due to the fact that the spirit and method of Shaftesbury's presentation are not controversial. The impetus to a statement and clarification of his opinions was no doubt determined in part by the teaching of Hobbes, as Fowler (Shaftesbury, 100) suggests. Hobbes had set the pace in the direction of naturalistic ethics and was for many subsequent ethical thinkers the subject of diverse discussion. But Shaftesbury appears more concerned to present his own opinions than to controvert those of someone else. Indeed, there is ground to hold that he had in mind not a refutation of Hobbes, but a clarification and vindication of his deistic position with reference to ethics. If ethical teaching was not as had been generally believed and as Locke maintained, an expression of "the will and law of God" (Essay Bk., I., Ch. 3, Sec. 6), what anchorage remained to it to give it stability and credibility? Shaftesbury himself leaves no doubt that he was concerned to save ethics in the divorce of ethics and religion in a deistic system. An overwhelmingly larger part of his "Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit" is devoted to a presentation of the independent appeal of ethics. To the consistent theist this would be gratuitous. Besides, the very introductory section of his "Inquiry" indicates the purport of the work to be to show that while religion and virtue are commonly held to be inseparable companions they are not so but that "each has its proper province

and due rank" (Char., I., 239). And in pursuance of this purpose Shaftesbury shows that while religion has an incidental ethical value as accompaniment of virtue, virtue wields an attractive power through an inherent charm. Shaftesbury might, accordingly, be more properly regarded as in antagonism with his teacher Locke who inculcated that morality, though empirically determined, is at its source an assertion of a divine will which has "by an inseparable connection joined virtue and public happiness together," and is on this account incumbent upon man. This view of Locke may at first glance appear striking as incongruous with his general empirical position, but it is urged here as representative of the tendency of his ethical theory had it been worked out. Rogers (Student's History, 357) may be appropriately cited here when he says that according to Locke "the true ground of morality is the will and law of a God" "who sees men in the dark, has in his hands rewards and punishments, and power enough to call to account the proudest offender." The view here given of Locke's ethical tendency finds further support in the article on Shaftesbury, Encyl. Britan., Vol. XXI., and in Sidgwick's Outlines (p. 176), where we are told that Locke regarded the aggregate of ethical rules as the law of God. Locke himself leaves no doubt as to his position in this matter when, in speaking of the proof of a deity (Essay, II., Bk. IV., Sec. 7), he denominates it a fundamental truth of such consequence that all religion and genuine morality depend upon it. Though this view of Locke's warranted Shaftesbury's opposition to him, yet in his formal public writings he does not mention Locke by name for the reason, as Gizycki (p. 76) appropriately suggests, that the reverence of a pupil for his teacher forbade. Locke superintended his entire early education. To him, as he confessed, next to his immediate parents, he owed the greatest obligation (Hodder I., 24). But in his "Letters to a Young Man" (p. 41), written after Locke's death, which were not for public knowledge, he freely censured Locke's theory of ethics, declaring it to be "very poor philosophy." Even mentioning Locke by name he says: "Locke struck the home blow. Hobbes' character and base slavish principles of government took off the poison of his philosophy. 'Twas Mr. Locke that struck at all fundamentals, threw all order and virtue out of the world, and made the very ideas of

these unnatural and without foundation in our minds" (*Ibid.*, 39). "Virtue, according to Mr. Locke, has no other measure, law, or rule, than fashion and custom; morality, justice, equity depend only on law and will. This is very poor philosophy." (*Ibid.*, 40, 41.) And yet Shaftesbury's importance as an ethical teacher lies not in his opposition to Locke but in his contrast to Hobbes, in the high level he gave to ethics in contradistinction to him, and in the comparative novelty of his inculcation of an ethical sense.] Hence, to appreciate Shaftesbury we must start with a presentation of the ethical teaching of Hobbes.

## HOBBS' ETHICAL THEORY

B. To Hobbes ethics is a human invention pure and simple, an expedient upon the road of human progress from savagery to civilization. It is an outcome of man's primitive nature and condition. In their primal natural state, according to Hobbes (*Leviathan*, pp. 81, *et sq.*), men are so equal in their faculties of body and mind that one cannot claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. This equality of ability gives rise to equality of hope in attaining the ends suggested by desire. But when two desire the same thing which they can't both enjoy, they become enemies, and on the way to the assertion of their respective desires they wage war upon one another. This condition on a small scale in the relation of individuals to each other is repeated in the large in society generally. In this state of virtual warfare of all against all there is no place for industry, culture of earth, navigation, or society, but continual danger of violent death, and consequent fear. But man desires peace, its opportunities and pleasures. He is, however, too selfish, according to Hobbes, to compose his differences with his fellows by concessions and mutual adaptations, so by general surrender a supreme power and authority is instituted to which all become subject in keeping with an accepted covenant. This covenant furnishes the norm of justice and the starting point of ethics. - "Justice is the keeping of valid covenants, injustice is non-performance of them." (*Leviathan*, pp. 97, 98.) Prior to covenant there is no

ethical distinction. Individual desire determines good and evil. There is consistently no such thing as conscience in our acceptation of the term in the individual of Hobbes' conception. Nor does it enter in our sense even after the institution of a covenant. For Hobbes conscience naturally carries no moral reference. It is simply as its literal signification implies, a knowing together shared by several instead of being confined to the individual subjectively. Violation of conscience to Hobbes is merely contravention by one of knowledge of anything shared by several. (Leviathan, 39-40.) It has an intellectual connotation and is in no sense of moral worth. Where men are out of relation with each other there is no place for conscience. The absence of a moral element from Hobbes' conception of conscience is characteristic of his entire ethical system. To possess worth and appeal morality must be more than mere human convention and custom. Its majesty lies either in its superhuman or super-material origin. With Hobbes it is neither of these. Its origin is entirely empirical. "Man has from birth nothing but sense" (Leviathan, 41), and from this all subsequent expressions of his life, even the so-called moral, are formed, although from the unmoral the moral cannot be derived.

The relativity of Hobbes' ethical principle is further manifest in its dependence upon pleasure. Man does the right or the just because it conduces to his peace and pleasure. The pleasant is the good, the unpleasant the evil. In such a system the painfulness of righteous self-surrender such as constitutes the grandeur and glory of martyrdom is wholly unthinkable. It is a thorough-going hedonism carried to a logical extreme which may be called moral only by an elastic usage of the term, but would be more correctly characterized as private speculation in the interest of personal pleasure.

## SHAFTESBURY'S ETHICAL TEACHING

### II

A. The step from the ethical teaching of Hobbes to that of Shaftesbury is comparable to a sudden rise from the depths to the heights. There we experience a sense of depression, here one of elevation into a lofty, purer atmosphere. The



contrast furnished by Shaftesbury's teaching has not been sufficiently distinguished and emphasized by anyone.

An exposition of Shaftesbury's ethical teaching must start as with Hobbes from a presentation of the nature of man. In each case the human material determines the ethical conception. Both had the significant insight that man and not God, as Locke maintained, is the starting point of ethical theory, although Shaftesbury transcended both in his insistence that morality is no manufacture either of human or divine effectuation. It is rather an entity or relationship inherent in the nature of things, that needed only to be detected. Not having been manufactured either divinely or humanly, as with Locke and Hobbes, it is presumably co-extensive with the rest of existence from which it is inseparable.

Both Hobbes and Shaftesbury proceed deductively from an assumption with regard to man's constitution, but from antipodal conceptions. To Hobbes, as we have seen, man is an exemplification of selfishness, the superstructure of his entire life being founded upon an unmitigated egoism. Shaftesbury starts from a more optimistic complimentary view of human nature. To him man is not only not selfish, but social. Indeed, to be unsocial is to be abnormal. "A mind that refuses its consent to what is acted in the whole and for the good of the whole is the same as a hand that should refuse to act for the body." (Regimen, p. 11.) Sociality is an ear-mark of man in his human distinction. "To be a man means to be a citizen of the world and to prefer the interest of the world." (*Ibid.*, 11.) "A human infant is of all the most helpless, weak, senseless, and longest continues so. Does not this refer man to society and force him to own that he is purposely, and not by accident, made rational and sociable, and cannot otherwise increase or subsist but in and by society?" (Regimen, p. 188.) Man accordingly is made for society, in it he attains his highest possibility, and apart from it would degenerate. The only perfection, the only tolerable state of man, and that alone in which he can possibly endure or subsist is society. (*Ibid.*, 52.) It is therefore an evidence of wisdom for a man to adapt himself to society. He is thus acting normally.

Not only is man social by nature, but good as well. Indeed, sociality which, according to Shaftesbury signifies har-

monious relationship and adaptation of man to his environment, implies a nature that is good. Shaftesbury very logically and philosophically denies an unmoral origin to the moral as is affirmed in the system of Hobbes. He very wisely says: "Faith, justice, honesty, and virtue, must have been as early as the state of nature or they could never have been at all." (*Characteristics*, I., p. 73.) "Civil union, or confederacy, could never make right or wrong if they subsisted not before." (*Ibid.*) "Worth and merit are substantial, and no way variable by fancy or will." (*Ibid.*, 83.) Man brings goodness with him and finds goodness in the universe when he comes. "As it seems hard to pronounce any man an absolute atheist, so is it to pronounce one absolutely corrupt or vicious, there being few even of the hardest villains who have not something of virtue." (*Characteristics*, I., p. 257.) "There scarcely is or can be any creature whom consciousness of villainy as such merely does not at all offend nor anything opprobrious or heinously imputable move or affect." (*Ibid.*, I., p. 306.) In fact, Shaftesbury maintains that absence of response to the good from the very moment when man is affected by sensible stimuli tokens an ill and unnatural constitution. Not only so, but so normal is man's native goodness that he does not lose it except through the application to him of some art or strong endeavor. (*Ibid.*, 259, 260.) Shaftesbury is very emphatic on this point. His teaching of man's native goodness is so clear and conspicuous that it is noteworthy that its conflict with orthodox Christian teaching of his time, and even of our's, has never been adverted to. While his deism was strenuously fought by contemporaries as inimical to Christianity, his anthropological teaching was more fundamentally subversive as undermining the very foundation of the Christian plan of salvation as laid down by Paul. In presentations and discussions of Shaftesbury his conception of goodness as proportion has commonly been exalted into a position of pre-eminence. There is, however, justification for maintaining that historically, both for theology and ethics, the implication of Shaftesbury's doctrine in its reference to the pessimistic conception of human nature as taught by orthodox Christianity and by Hobbes should receive more prominence and consideration.

It is the naturalness and instinctiveness of goodness to a

human being that gives rise to Shaftesbury's conception of conscience. ✓ The difficulty that is generally found in an attempt to explain conscience does not exist for him. To him it is logically consistent with his fundamental teaching of human nature. Goodness is harmony, naturalness, and peace or ease. Badness is disharmony, unnaturalness, and discomfort or pain. Accordingly, he says: Two things are horribly offensive and grievous to a rational creature, viz.: to have mental reflection of any unjust act which he knows to be naturally odious and ill-deserving, or of any foolish action which he knows to be prejudicial to his own interest or happiness. The former of these is conscience. Conscience, therefore, is not representative, as is commonly believed, of man's sense of responsibility to and fear of the Deity. In Shaftesbury's sense, conscience is antecedent and contributory to the conscience of religion. How conscience in Shaftesbury's sense leads to conscience in the religious sense is ingeniously explained by him thus: "What men know they deserve from every one they necessarily fear and expect from all. Thus suspicions and ill apprehensions must arise with terror, both of men and of the Deity." (Char., I., 306.) But conscience in Shaftesbury's sense may exist apart from religion, although the religious conscience cannot exist apart from it. It is simply man's painful sense of disharmony and disruption from that which is natural.

Shaftesbury's conviction of the social and moral nature of man consists with his conception of things universally. To understand him best it is necessary to view his teachings in relation to a conception of a whole which is fundamental with him and to which with varied application and in various forms he refers again and again.

## THE DOCTRINE OF THE WHOLE

B. This whole is Shaftesbury's starting point. It comprises all that is outside of or objective to the Deity. It is an entire thing of which all hangs together as of a piece. (Characteristics, II., 99.) It is what he understood by the universe.

The necessity of such a starting point Shaftesbury prop-

erly indicates in the need of some standard of measurement in a world where all is so plainly relative. An artist, he tells us (*Ibid.*, I., 214), must have an idea of perfection to which to refer for guidance or his performance will be found to be defective and mean. Although his ambition is to please the world he must in his references be above it. He must hold his mental eye fixed upon that beauty of nature as a whole which mankind in their limited or unrefined vision call unintelligible. The artist in this conception is presented, as he really is, as the mediator and interpreter between the whole and its constituent parts. That Shaftesbury himself as moral teacher was guided by such thought of a higher reference appears in his assertion with regard to such teachers. He says (*Ibid.*, I., 216) that there can be no kind of writing which relates to men and manners where it is not necessary for the author to understand poetical and moral truth, the beauty of sentiments, the sublime of characters, and carry in his eye the model or exemplar of that natural grace which gives to every action its attractive charm. This model or exemplar of natural grace is Shaftesbury's standard, expressed or implied, to which he makes persistent reference. It is something, he tells us, to which we must look up or back, something to be regarded in the light of a higher country to which our allegiance must be paid.

This whole in Shaftesbury's teaching is no gratuitous assumption. In the nature of the case it cannot be demonstrated. It is a logical conclusion based upon the necessary assumption of a rational universe. We find relation in that part of the universe with which we are familiar. As to the part which lies beyond our present knowledge, we may properly have recourse to the reasonable claim that "if in the infinite residue, there were no principle of union, it would seem next to impossible that things within our sphere should be consistent and keep in order. What was infinite would be predominant." (*Characteristics*, II., 108.)

Having thus vindicated the existence of order or relation in the realm beyond our present perception and knowledge, Shaftesbury holds this order to indicate logically the existence of a perfect whole necessitated by the aggregation of parts which are orderly. To his mind detection of the whole is consequent upon a knowledge of a part thereof. We have an echo of this doctrine in Tennyson's familiar lines,

"Flower in the crannied wall,  
I pluck you out of the crannies;  
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,  
Little flower—but if I could understand  
What you are, root and all, and all in all,  
I should know what God and man is."

Shaftesbury, however, went farther than Tennyson in that he believed himself to be possessed of a sufficient knowledge of the part to justify him, through its universal relation, to infer a knowledge of the whole. He is so convinced of his possession of such knowledge that in "The Moralists" he expresses surprise at Philocles, who has such insight and accurate judgment in the particulars of natural beings and operations that he is no better judge than he is of the structure of things in general. Who better than yourself, says Theocles (Char., II., 61), who is representative of Shaftesbury, can show the structure of each plant and animal body, declare the office of every part and organ, and tell the uses, ends, and advantages to which they serve? How, therefore, should you prove so ill a naturalist in this whole, and understand so little the anatomy of the world and nature, as not to discern this same relation of parts, the same consistency and uniformity in the universe!

His conception of the reality of the whole Shaftesbury emphasizes by pointing out that it is inescapable. It is the implied background of our entire lives and determines us variously whether we know it or are unconscious of it. We are deeply indebted to it. It matters not how depraved our humors or taste, we cannot resist a natural anticipation in behalf of nature or the whole, according to whose supposed standard we perpetually approve or disapprove, and to which in all natural appearances, all moral actions, we inevitably appeal and pay a constant homage. It is the basis of life's enthusiasms and finer aspects. It is fundamental to the beauty of poetry and the arts. In confirmation of this claim he cites Lucretius as example, who is averse to a universal background and traces all from a human standpoint, but fails to get away from the universal. He unconsciously reflects it in his admiration and rapturous views of nature. The lover, the ambitious, the warrior, the virtuoso would lose much of their enjoyments if in the beauties which they admire

and passionately pursue there were no reference or regard to any higher majesty or grandeur than what simply results from the particular objects of their pursuit. This conceit of a universal background furnishes the seasoning to most of our pleasures in life (Char., II., 175). The inescapableness of the whole constituting nature Shaftesbury puts pointedly in his translation of the words of Horace: "You may turn out nature with a pitchfork, yet back she will keep coming" (Char., II., 289).

Now, although the whole as standard of appeal and background of life's reference is unavoidable, there are many who fail to find it. This results from a reversal of the proper order that should obtain in the statement of our relation to the universe. We begin with ourselves and relate all to us instead of oppositely relating ourselves to the all. We subject the interest of the whole to the good and interest of the part. Pope, echoing Shaftesbury, phrased this well when he said (Essay on Man, Epistle, I.) that when human pride questions the phenomena of creation it concludes that all is for its sake, and exclaims:

"For me kind nature wakes her genial power,  
Suckles each herb, and spreads out every flower;  
Annual for me, the grape, the rose, renew  
The juice nectareous, and the balmy dew;  
For me, the mine a thousand treasures brings;  
For me, health gushes from a thousand springs;  
Seas roll to waft me, suns to light me rise;  
My footstool earth, my canopy the skies."

This attitude Shaftesbury opposes. It enlarges the particular at the cost of the obscuration of the general, forgetting or not knowing that the individual only receives worth and significance from the general or whole.

This whole with which Shaftesbury starts is an all-inclusive relationship. Each particular is in relation with all in general and the latter is in relation with each particular. The whole is in other words an organism. No single entity, however complete a system of parts it presents with reference to all within, can be allowed in the same manner complete as to all without, but must be considered as having a

further relation abroad to the system of its kind. This system of its kind has relation to a higher, this to the world, and this to the universe. So "all things are united" (Char., II., 64)) and accordingly organic.

To Shaftesbury the harmonious is the good. Since, according to him, the whole is harmonious, it is good. This he further clinches by the argument that every particular nature produces what is good to itself unless something foreign prevents or disturbs. If now every particular nature be thus constantly and unerringly true to itself to produce what is only good for itself and conducing to its own right state, shall not the general nature or the whole do full as much since there is nothing foreign to it to do it violence or force it out of its natural way? Hence, the whole is good.

Having settled upon the idea of a whole as fundamental to his system, Shaftesbury finds in it a manifold significance and application. It alone gives validity and coherence to the particulars of human experience. Borne steadily in mind it explains all seeming incongruities and removes all forbidding features and deformities, whether of nature or mankind, causing them to vanish forthwith. Lack of this view tends to rob things of a genuine enduring worth and to suppress the admiration of natural beauties. If the universe as a whole is regarded as a pattern of disorder it is not likely to be believed to afford in its particulars anything lovable or admirable. From the vantage-point of Shaftesbury's conception of a whole the world and its details are illumined with a glow of poetic beauty.

The application and influence of this idea is, however, not only physical, it has a moral value as well. The whole as a harmonious relation furnishes a standard by which the good may be determined. Only that is good which conduces to the maintenance of the whole of which it is a part. Whatever occasions the closer union of the individual with the generality conduces to the greater goodness of that individual. Whatever bears hurtfully upon the whole is vicious. Indeed, according to Shaftesbury, good in the particular presupposes good in the general, of which it is only an expression or phenomenon just as the tree springing from the earth presupposes the nurturing soil. While it is commonly held that particular virtues like charity begin at home, Shaftesbury holds the interesting opposite view that particular attach-

ments imply a precedent general attachment. "To be a friend to anyone in particular it is necessary to be first a friend to mankind" (Char., I., 40). This was no less striking in his time than it appears to us. After the manner of Plato, his master, Shaftesbury recognizes such objection and meets it. In "The Moralists" (Char., II., 41), Philocles objects that it is difficult to qualify for such friendship. To this Shaftesbury, in the character of Theocles, replies that "to be justly styled the friend of mankind requires no more than to be good and virtuous." His meaning, more plainly stated, is that to be a friend in particular or in the concrete one must first have the quality or be characterized by friendship in the abstract. To be good or virtuous one must have goodness or virtue. These things in the abstract are simply statements of one's sense of conformity with the whole. This conformity or love, which is the prerequisite of particular love, friendship, goodness or virtue, is to Shaftesbury's conviction the height of goodness, and constitutive of the temper that is called divine. That relation to the whole is the standard of goodness in Shaftesbury's teaching and not mere harmony of relations has not been recognized. Hettner, f.i. (Gesch. der Englischen Lit., 180) says with reference to Shaftesbury that: "Die Tugend ist sittliche Schoenheit. Sie ist die innere Einheit und Ordnung, das glueckliche Gleichgewicht aller Kraefte und Neigungen, Lebensharmonie." This is representative of a common view of Shaftesbury's conception of goodness. It is, however, only partially true. It does not go far enough. It is from Shaftesbury's standpoint goodness without its foundation, and so not a genuine enduring thing. Shaftesbury not only demands harmonious relationship subjectively existent, but a harmony of this inner status with the objective whole of which the individual is an inseparable part. The whole is the final standard of moral appeal.

The whole not only furnishes the standard of goodness, it is conducive to and conservative of it. It thus gives it stability and reliability. This Shaftesbury points out variously. Starting with the insistence that virtue is love of order, he maintains consistently that this admiration will grow in strength in proportion to the dimensions of the object in which the order is found. Accordingly, it will reach its height of fervor when exercised "in so ample and mag-



nificent a subject as the whole which exhibits a divine order" (Char., I., 279). This influence of the whole he further indicates in the claim that on the physical side man must have exercise of his parts to keep him whole and healthy. It is not otherwise on his inner or spiritual side. Nothing, says he, is so essential to it as exercise. This it finds in social or natural affection, which is affection for the whole. Such affection alone furnishes real enjoyment and thus conduces to a life that is moral.

This determinative moral value of the whole is even more evident, according to Shaftesbury's teaching, in his conception of conscience, as has already been explained. To him conscience is, according to its experience of pleasure or pain, expressive of one's harmony or disharmony with the whole. The offensiveness and grievousness of the disharmony is such that through the pain it inflicts in conscience the whole compels a recognition of itself and thus contributes to the maintenance of virtue. Indeed, disregard of the whole makes goodness uncertain or even destroys it. A friendship confined to an individual is unreliable. It must have as background affection for the whole to possess constancy and permanency. Every immorality and enormity of life, says he (Char., II., 345), is caused by neglect of this consideration. It is on this ground of the evil of a partial view of things that Shaftesbury condemned Egyptian animal worship as containing a possible unsocial tendency.

Determining virtue by giving it norm and stability the whole further favors it by effecting the pleasure or happiness which is its concomitant. Pleasure or happiness, according to Shaftesbury, is impossible in a state of separateness and disunion. Loneliness cannot well or long enjoy anything. Its enjoyment is not real and enduring. It would soon be cloyed and grow uneasy till it could impart and thus share its experience. This is a condition which can't be disregarded long without being avenged. Nature disregarded in this will break out (Char., I., 310). Persistent disregard of nature or the claims of the whole will entail the greatest of miseries. Since this is so, Shaftesbury takes it as a mark of the ruling wisdom in nature by which it leads private interest to an interest in the general good and thus to virtue.

The conception of a harmonious whole is for Shaftesbury the solvent of the problem presented by the diverse and con-

flicting affections of human life. He recognizes three expressions of these affections (Char., I., 286):

(1) Natural affections which lead to the good of the public;

(2) Self-affections which lead only to the good of the private;

(3) Such as tend to the good of neither but contrariwise and are unnatural.

One of these is fundamental to all conduct as its moving cause. We are moved in the direction of our strongest affections or passions measured either in force or number. But how prevent a consequent conflict? Nature prevents this automatically through the assertion of its harmonious relationships. There is an inner harmony as well as an outer one. Disturbance of this by excess in any direction, either good or ill, entails unhappiness. We must foster self-regarding affections. Insufficient attention in this direction is vicious with reference to the design and end of nature in the whole. She has attached extreme care to single parts of our constitution by safe-guarding them with particular solicitude. She certainly must intend the same relatively to the whole, whether of body or soul. Excess in the direction of egoistic interest is bad in that it destroys the balance of harmony between self, the part, and the whole. This whole is inescapable and must be regarded, but not exclusively. Self must be regarded also. Reconciliation obtains in the fact that they are not actually dis severed, but so connected organically that proper devotion to self advances the whole which reacts beneficially upon the part, and due devotion to the whole directly furthers the part which it contains.

The whole thus employed by Shaftesbury does not for him exhaust reality. Viewed in and by itself it is simply an articulated system of relationships in which everything is essential to everything else. But it is a vast machine-like structure that also stands in a relation. It is representative of a "sovereign genius and first beauty" (Char., II., 40), to which it is related. So, while in a sense Shaftesbury is dualistic in positing a supreme mind and something that is objective to it, that supreme mind is part of a greater whole from which it seems to be inseparable. He therefore presents what might be termed a modified dualism.

It is interesting to note the significance of Shaftesbury's

conception of the whole in his life. Mandeville, with characteristic cynicism (Fowler, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, 142), regarded Shaftesbury's interest in a larger whole as merely theoretical, and so calls on him to give evidence of it "not by living in retirement and inactivity, but by serving his country in the field or by attempting to retrieve its ruined finances." Vater (Pope and Shaftesbury, 13) very correctly brands this attempted detraction as an expression of the partisan prejudice of one whose exaggeration overlooked the illness of the one criticised and his political conditions. Shaftesbury's love of the generality was no mere pretty theory but a vital principle. This is testified by others with Vater, who says (*Ibid.*, 17) that Shaftesbury possessed in rich measure the patriotism he so highly praised. Apart from such testimony of later students of Shaftesbury his own words will be accepted in vindication of his patriotic virtue in the largest sense by those who know the genuineness of his modesty, his unswerving single-eyed devotion to truth, and his nobility of character in general. In a letter to his friend Furley (Original Letters, 271), dated July, 1712, the year before his death, he attributes his weakened health to cares and labors borne in behalf of the good interest and cause of liberty and mankind. On other occasions he wrote to the same friend (*Ibid.*, 207), "I know no better use for my life than to spend it for one's country, and for mankind, and if I thought my life of no use to the public, I should not be at the pains I am at of preserving it." And again, when in poor health, he wrote (*Ibid.*, 242), "Whilst I can have any share (be it ever so little) in the service of my friends, my country, or mankind, I can be contented with any life, any health, or any constitution ever so bad, and can live as happily thus as at any time of my life." In view of such professions, which represent vital convictions, it may be said that Shaftesbury's philosophy was no mere speculation, but an expression of the man. To him the whole as a universal, harmonious relationship was an actuality. Love for it was his dominant passion.

This basic conception of Shaftesbury's has not, as already pointed out, been duly regarded, but along with other important convictions of his has wielded great influence in supplying to others the dominant note or determining spirit of their literary production. Herder in his "Naturhymnus," Thomson more conspicuously in "The Seasons," which in-

spired Tennyson, and others may be said to have derived inspiration and suggestion at the lips of "The Moralists." Alexander Pope is, as has been extensively recognized, clearly the largest debtor. His poetry is not only, as Stephen says (*Dict. of Nat. Biog.*, Vol. XLVI., p. 124), the essence of the first half of the eighteenth century, but in its more important parts it is almost literally a reproduction of Shaftesbury. To show this, as well as for the sake of the greater emphasis thereby given to the main insinuations of our author, we give to the subject a little more particular and extended illustration.

Like Shaftesbury, Pope rears the structure of his poetical teaching upon the conception of a whole consisting of God and Nature:

"All are but parts of one stupendous whole,  
Whose body Nature is, and God the soul."  
(*Essay, Epistle I.*)

This whole exists in organic inner relation. A chain of love unites all below and all above.

"Nothing is foreign; parts relate to whole;  
One all-extending, all-preserving Soul  
Connects each being, greatest with the least."  
(*Ibid.*, III.)

To understand a part requires knowledge of the whole of which it is a part.

"He, who through vast immensity can pierce,  
Sees worlds on worlds compose one universe,  
May tell why Heaven made us as we are." (*Ibid.*, I.)

In the light of the whole, accordingly, parts lose the harshness of their incongruity which is only seeming.

"Respecting man whatever wrong we call,  
May, must be right, as relative to all." (*Ibid.*)

Our failure to see this reflects our ignorance. In which case it may be said:

"All nature is but art, unknown to thee;  
All chance, direction which thou canst not see;

All discord, harmony not understood;  
All partial evil, universal good." (*Ibid.*)

Larger knowledge sufficiently inclusive to embrace the whole would discover the relativity and appropriateness of all things within that whole. This Pope implies thus:

"When the proud steed shall know why man restrains  
His fiery course, or drives him o'er the plains;  
When the dull ox, why now he breaks the clod,  
Is now a victim, and now Egypt's god,  
Then shall man's pride and dullness comprehend  
His actions, passions, being's use and end." (*Ibid.*)

This differently stated declares that just as we understand what is incomprehensible to the brutes because of their limitation, so spirits higher than we are in the scale of existence may comprehend what is yet unintelligible to us.

"Heaven from all creatures hides the book of fate,  
From brutes what men, from men what spirits know."  
(*Ibid.*, I.)

Our failure to find a thread of purpose winding through the mazes of the universe is, therefore, partly our ignorance, but chiefly, as has been said, our pride, which exaggerating our self-importance, depreciates the world, and attempts to render it subservient to us instead of ourselves to it. This Pope castigates by asking:

"Has God, thou fool! worked solely for thy good,  
Thy joy, thy pastime, thy attire, thy food?"  
(*Ibid.*, III.)

It is true that "Man, like the generous vine, supported lives" (*Ibid.*), but to think all made for one and not one for all is, says Pope, to fall short of reason. "God framed a whole, the whole to bless." (*Ibid.*)

"The Universal Cause  
Acts not by partial, but by general laws;  
And makes what happiness we justly call,  
Subsist not in the good of one, but all." (*Ibid.*, IV.)

Consistently with his teaching of the supremacy of the whole as Shaftesbury conceived it, Pope emphasizes the precedence of the whole over the part. There are not nor can there be any favorites or exceptions that may be heeded by the operation of the External Cause. (*Ibid.*, IV.)

In the more particular reference to his teaching with regard to the individual, Pope presents a literal reproduction of Shaftesbury. Like our author, he is antipodal to Hobbes. His view of man's primitive condition is not of elements at war with one another. For him "the state of nature was the reign of God." (*Ibid.*, III.) There were, 'tis true, self-regarding elements at the beginning, but there were also social proclivities which served as a bond of union. Hence,

"Self-love and social at her birth began,  
Union the bond of all things, and of man." (*Ibid.*)

For "true self-love and social are the same." (*Ibid.*, IV.)

Finally, in his view of the significance of virtue and vice to the individual, Pope is at one with Shaftesbury. There is reward and punishment not, however, as the goal but as the result of conduct. This result is always to be sought for in kind. Spiritual causes must have spiritual consequences. The reward of virtue is, therefore, not bread but happiness. And this is the greatest reward.

"What nothing earthly gives or can destroy,  
The soul's calm sunshine, and the heartfelt joy,  
Is virtue's prize." (*Ibid.*, IV.)

One self-approving hour of such outweighs years of other recognition. Not only is this true according to Pope, but with Shaftesbury he further maintains that "Virtue alone is happiness below." (*Ibid.*)

With this evidence of Shaftesbury's doctrine of the whole, together with other subordinate teachings logically derived therefrom employed by Pope, which might be even more extensively illustrated, the judgment of Herder (cf. Pope and Shaftesbury, Vater, 22), is justified, that "ohne die Moralisten haette Pope die besten Verse seines Essay on Man schwerlich geschrieben."

## COMPARATIVE VALUE OF SHAFTESBURY'S TEACHING

C. Having now Shaftesbury's teaching of the whole in mind, we see at once the irreconcilable difference between him and Hobbes in the nature and value of their respective ethical positions. Hobbes derives his norm of ethical conduct from a consideration of the individual; Shaftesbury deduces his from the universal. To Hobbes the individual is all-important, to Shaftesbury it is the generality. Shaftesbury, in the spirit of Spinoza or Leibnitz, views the individual from the standpoint of the universal. The universal harmony must prevail. For this harmony is the essence of virtue and man must keep himself in articulation with it. The ethical value of his life is to be measured by the extent of its conformation with the general life. "It is shame and folly to wish against the whole." (Regimen, 93.) "The good of mankind, that alone shouldst thou intend and that perform as far as in thee lies." (*Ibid.*, 72.) When personal interest and that of the public are in opposition, one is far from virtue (*Ibid.*, 73). The appeal of virtue in Hobbes' teaching is strictly personal, in that of Shaftesbury it is as conspicuously impersonal. In the one it is a base self-assertion, in the other a sublime self-surrender. With Hobbes man is born without morality and invents it. With Shaftesbury man is born as a moral possibility and is left to realize and maintain it.

Shaftesbury's superiority to Hobbes is not inferior to that with which he may be credited in comparison with Locke. To both Hobbes and Locke morality is a manufacture with only this difference, that while to one it is a human handiwork, to the other it is of Divine origin. Locke might be regarded as rendering morality more impressive by reason of its higher ultimate source, but this result will only obtain with the unthinking. Moral sanction to be valid must in the last analysis be something inherent and not superimposed. Because a god commands the moral might make it more certain of acceptance and realization from its association with power and its suggestion of penalty, but this would be to make morality unmoral. In Kant's phraseology it would be legality but not morality. Further, morality is not moral merely when imposed by Divine will even apart from promise or penalty. What assurance have we that this Divine will does

not act arbitrarily in the matter, which again would rob morality of moral quality by exposing it to the suspicion of being capricious. Specific moral enactment may express arbitrary determination, but fundamentally morality must be absolute and independent. Shaftesbury finally meets this requirement in contrast to Hobbes and Locke by removing the source and sanction of morality from both human and Divine origin and placing it, as has been shown, in the universal constitution of things themselves. He would have said in the language of Stephen (*Science of Ethics*, 142), that "the moral law is as independent of the legislature as the movements of the planets." He actually went a step further than this and taught that the moral law is independent even of Divine legislation. It is antecedent to man and even obligatory upon God if He is to subsist in harmonious relationship with the rest of existence. This view may not, as was the case, be acceptable to the opponent of the deistic position as exemplified by Shaftesbury. It may be construed as derogatory to the Deity. It need not, however, be so construed. It would be a more and not less creditable Deity who recognized and accepted the appeal and obligation of the moral law and gave himself to be its mouthpiece. And if the fear were persisted in that the implication of Shaftesbury's position lowered the dignity of the Deity, it could be urged by way of compensation that it exalted the worth and appeal of morality. And if we are concerned, as we should be, with man's salvation and not with God's safety, the position maintained by Shaftesbury is incomparably more desirable. It is no irreverence to say that man's chief concern is man. Nor is any irreverence implied to say from this standpoint that God may take care of Himself.

But virtue, according to Shaftesbury, is not mere harmony between the individual and the universal. He saw clearly and emphasized appropriately that moral merit is not to be credited to mechanical action, but is allowable only to that which is conscious and intentional. Shaftesbury makes here an interesting and novel distinction between goodness and virtue. He terms that goodness by which a creature is carried as result of natural temper or bent of affections towards good and against evil. (*Characteristics*, I., p. 250.) It must also be attended with some affection. (*Ibid.*, 247.) Such goodness lies within the reach and capacity of all sensible creatures. (*Ibid.*, 251.) Virtue, on the other hand, is



higher and better. It involves goodness and has an additional element. "To be virtuous one must exercise conscious choice based upon a knowledge of conflicting alternatives. If a creature be generous, kind, constant, etc., and yet cannot reflect upon what he does or sees others do so as to take notice of what is worthy or honest, and make that notice or conception of worth and honesty to be an object of his affection, he has not the character of being virtuous. (*Ibid.*, 253.)

The greater the effort implied in choosing, the greater the virtue. (*Ibid.*, 256.) And such moral worth is attributable only to man. (*Ibid.*, 251.)

Since virtue is choice between conflicting alternatives, there arises further qualification of virtue by motive. Without motive virtue degenerates into a mere mechanical goodness, but the motive must be moral. To be moral it must be social in purport, tending to the general good, and it must be without personal reference in the end to be obtained. In the spirit of Kant, Shaftesbury makes virtue an end in itself. It must not embody a spirit of commercialism or speculation. If virtue be not really estimable in itself, he says, I can see nothing estimable in following it for the sake of a bargain. If the love of doing good be not of itself a good and right inclination, I know not how there can possibly be such a thing as goodness or virtue. (*Ibid.*, I., p. 66.) Nor is the matter of the moral value of motive altered by its removal to a distance. Shaftesbury protests strongly in the interest of the integrity of virtue against the introduction of the selfish motive of reward hereafter. "If a saint had no other virtue than what was raised in him by the same objects of reward and punishment in a more distant state, I know not whose love or esteem he might gain besides, but for my own part I should never think him worthy of mine. (*Ibid.*, p. 85.) Goodness out of fear of deity or hope of reward is not goodness. (*Ibid.*, p. 267.)

There needs be said that the goodness with which Shaftesbury credits man as a native endowment is not an accomplishment but a faculty. He may be said to be born good to the end that he might become virtuous. Goodness, according to Shaftesbury, being the possibility, virtue the realization. And it is here that we have what might be termed Shaftesbury's most characteristic ethical teaching and contribution to the study.

## THE MORAL SENSE

D. To realize the significance and value of this we must start with Shaftesbury's insistence of the naturalness and inherency of moral distinctions in the universe. Morality is neither divinely created nor humanly manufactured, it is original and substantial. Nor is it, to begin with, subjective to man, but objective. Accordingly, the question may be raised, in fact, is unavoidable, how does man arrive at knowledge of this morality? How is the mediation between the objective and the subjective in the case effected? This, for Shaftesbury, is easily brought about by his unique conception of morality.

Morality is commonly taken to imply a spiritual attitude or disposition of the individual in matters pertaining to conduct. It is primarily a matter of motive. Without this subjective element morality is a kind of mechanics, a beautiful counterfeit without a soul. In Shaftesbury's moral scheme morality is primarily and principally objective to man, something that he can perceive and imitate, or adapt himself to. It is a harmonious relationship, a beauty of conduct the attractiveness of which consists in the harmonious articulation of its parts or purposes to one another, and to the rest of things besides. "There is, says Shaftesbury (*Characteristics*, II., p. 137), in certain figures a natural beauty which the eye finds as soon as the object is presented to it. And is there not as natural a beauty of actions?" Indeed, "the most natural beauty in the world is honesty and moral truth" (*Ibid.*, I., p. 94). Beauty and good are one and the same (*Ibid.*, II., p. 128). There is no real good beside the enjoyment of beauty, and there is no enjoyment of beauty beside what is good. (*Ibid.*, 141.)

The substantive independent existence of the good as a moral standard cannot be more emphatically put than when Shaftesbury exalts it into a standard of moral measurement of the Deity Himself. This he does when he says: "Whoever thinks there is a God and pretends formally to believe that He is just and good, must suppose that there is independently such a thing as justice and injustice, truth and falsehood, right and wrong, according to which he pronounces that God is just, righteous, and true. If the mere will, decree, or law of God be said absolutely to constitute right and

wrong, then are these latter words of no significance." (*Ibid.*, I., 264.) In other words, God's moral determinations are to be measured by an objective moral standard.

How does man arrive at this objective morality of a beautiful harmonious relationship? Here Shaftesbury has made his most striking contribution to the history of ethics. Leslie Stephen (*Free-thinking*, p. 265) calls it Shaftesbury's invention. According to Shaftesbury, man enters the world dowered with a many-sided sensitiveness to various forms of beauty. Fundamentally, all beauty is harmony, which expresses itself variously. There is a beauty of harmony in sounds, another in sights, and another in conduct. To each of these there is a corresponding sense. The beautiful in sights is perceived by the eye, the beautiful in sound by the ear, and the beautiful in conduct by a moral sense, or taste. This moral sense Stephen (*Ibid.*, 267) describes as "merely a particular case of that sense by which we perceive the all-prevailing harmony. That harmony, as revealed to our imagination, produces the sense of the beautiful; as partially apprehended by our reason it produces philosophy; and as embodied in the workings of human nature it gives rise to the moral sense." This description of Stephen's is excellent but for the qualification that the harmony existing and experience does not produce the several corresponding senses. They are part and parcel of man's native endowment. They are human capabilities. The diverse expressions of the beautiful are merely occasions of the exercise of these capabilities. They are simply different exhibitions of the same fundamental responsiveness, according to the respective natures of the stimuli presented.

The naturalness and inherency of this moral sense, as part of man's native equipment, Shaftesbury has plainly emphasized. "Sense of right and wrong is as natural to us as natural affection and is a first principle in our constitution and make. There is no speculative opinion, persuasion or belief which is capable immediately or directly to exclude or destroy it." (*Characteristics*, I., 260.) "Not only is there no speculative opinion, persuasion, or belief which is capable immediately or directly to exclude or destroy this moral sense, but, as if growing in strength of assurance with regard to it, Shaftesbury, a little later on, says, "'Tis impossible that this can instantly or without much force and violence be effaced

or struck out of the natural temper even by means of the most extravagant belief or opinion in the world." (*Ibid.*, 261.) And much later still (*Ibid.*, II., 344) he maintains that man's moral sense is not only natural and essential, but that "You can't get rid of it."

But this moral sense is not to be regarded as a fully formed faculty with which man enters life any more than any other with which he is endowed to face life with its manifold possibilities and duties. In the spirit of Shaftesbury's familiar classicism, we might say it does not spring full-formed like Minerva from the brow of Zeus. Like sight, like hearing, like man's other senses, his moral sense, differing from the others in being dissociated from any physical organ and in being thus purely spiritual, starts as they do as a rudimentary possibility requiring development. It requires use, practice, culture and criticism. Accordingly, it is educable, and if not educated will remain stunted or become through wrong development perverted. Its education should be begun early, when material is plastic, in which case it is effected for us by discreet sympathetic teachers. It can be later continued and furthered by ourselves. It is in keeping with this opinion that Shaftesbury says (*Characteristics*, II., p. 266) that, in this matter, "the youth alone are to be regarded. The rest are confirmed and hardened in their way. Something should therefore be thought of in behalf of our generous youths towards correcting their taste or relish in the concerns of life." Education of the moral sense is so sure and effective that thereby "such an opinion of good could be settled in ourselves as would secure an invariable, agreeable, and just taste in life and manners (*Ibid.*, p. 272). The man who represents the result of the education of the moral sense in keeping with Shaftesbury's idea will be so disposed morally that he will respond to moral appeal with the same automatic certainty as obtains in the reaction of any bodily sense to its appropriate stimulus.

Shaftesbury abundantly encourages the cultivation of the moral sense by placing in clear outline its stimulative value to conduct. This taste, says he (*Ibid.*, II., 344), determines goodness where opportunity is given it to operate. "Without it there is no incentive to morality" (*Ibid.*, p. 265). For "'Tis not merely what we call principle, but a taste which governs man. They may think for certain 'this is right, or

that wrong,' they may believe 'this a crime, or that a sin, this punishable by man, or that by God,' yet if the savour of things lies cross to honesty; if the fancy be florid and the appetite high towards the subaltern beauties and lower order of worldly symmetries and proportions, the conduct infallibly turns this latter way." "Even conscience, such as is owing to religious discipline, will make but a slight figure where this taste is set amiss. (*Ibid.*, p. 265.) This taste is at last what will influence. (*Ibid.*, p. 266.) In view of the significance of the moral taste as here indicated, the high importance attached to it in this paper is abundantly justified. Shaftesbury himself regarded his teaching of the moral sense as among his most important. For he says (*Ibid.*, II., p. 344), that to demonstrate the reasonableness of a proportionate taste was one of the main aims of his work.

## SHAFTESBURY AND CUMBERLAND

E. Shaftesbury's teaching of the moral taste or sense is his most unique contribution to ethical history. His other positions, more or less modified, appear before as after him, but in this he is entirely original. The only antecedent English ethical writer with whom he might be brought into comparison is Richard Cumberland, whose *De Legibus Naturæ* appeared in 1672, over a quarter of a century before the first appearance of Shaftesbury's *Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit*. (Sidgwick, 184.) In general, Cumberland's work can't be brought into comparison with that of Shaftesbury. Appearing originally in Latin, it has been little translated. It is long drawn, pedantic, uninspiring, and wearisome, while Shaftesbury is, as a rule, lucid, not too verbose, dignified in treatment, and always exalted and inspiring in spirit. But we find several of Shaftesbury's main contentions, as, for instance, against Locke or Hobbes, anticipated, and more or less clearly stated by Cumberland. He is openly in opposition to Hobbes. To him man is egoistic by nature as to Hobbes, but he is also social. This sociality, however, is not a result of self-seeking social compact, but an original endowment. He even goes so far as to maintain (*De Legibus*, p. 110) that men universally respect the general good earlier than their own. Men are thus good by nature. The larger

nature of which man is part is also good. Goodness is inherent therein, but this quality, according to Cumberland, is not, as with Shaftesbury, original and substantive, but created. It owes its existence to Divine creation. Cumberland is in complete accord with Locke in regarding morality as inherent in the universal order of things, but by Divine determination. And yet, from this starting point wherein he differs from Shaftesbury, he differs more widely from him in the method of arriving at a knowledge of the moral. With Cumberland it is entirely rational and intellectual. "Certain propositions," he says (*Ibid.*, p. 39), "of unchangeable truth which direct our voluntary actions about choosing good and refusing evil, and impose an obligation to external actions even without laws, and laying aside all considerations of those compacts which constitute civil government, are from the nature of things and of men necessarily suggested to the minds of men and therefore really exist there." We see here the recognition of moral truth to be entirely intellectualistic. This same fact receives further exhibition and confirmation in Cumberland's conception of conscience. To him conscience is entirely a matter intellectual. It is a judicial function which is necessarily rational. He says in this connection, "Our mind is conscious to itself of all its own actions. It sits a judge upon its own actions and thence procures to itself either tranquillity and joy or anxiety and sorrow. In this power of the mind and the actions thence arising consists the whole force of conscience by which it proposes laws to itself, examines its past, and regulates its future conduct" (*De Legibus*, 112). According to this, man's apprehension of moral truth is mediated by an intellectual process, and the result of the process remains intellectual. Feeling plays no part and is unnecessary. With Shaftesbury there is no intellectual mediation. The mind does not first sit in judgment upon facts to determine their moral signification. But oppositely, the mental recognition is a later process. We recognize the good, which is the harmonious, the beautiful, by direct intuition of the moral sense. We are by nature sensitive to the moral as the photographer's plate is to the pencilings of the light. The result is equally direct and certain in either case. To indicate more strikingly the contrast between Cumberland and Shaftesbury in the matter of moral apprehension, it may be said that according to Cumberland the right

reaches feeling through the mind, whereas with Shaftesbury it reaches the mind through feeling. Shaftesbury differs entirely from Cumberland in this aspect of his ethical teaching and was in no sense even in the least suggestively anticipated by him.

## ETHICS AND RELIGION

### RELATION IN SHAFTESBURY'S SYSTEM

*F.* What in Shaftesbury's system is the relation of ethics to religion? This is a query of great present-day interest, but one in which Shaftesbury does not give us any information of historical value, although historically he is of great moral value in the history of the controversy. He may be credited with high importance as conspicuous among the earlier deists for having emphasized the distinctness of ethics and religion and thus broadened the way to a study of their respective implications and mutual relations. Till Shaftesbury's time the subject had, as he mentions (*Characteristics*, I., 238), been little examined. It was still, as acknowledged by him, of dangerous speculation. And yet, with characteristic courage for which he was always conspicuous, he undertook the investigation, and conducted it according to his information and ability with exemplary candor.

Leslie Stephen has well said (*English Thought*, II., p. 2) that speculations as to morality inevitably increase as the vision of God becomes faint. This may be true, and very likely is in a large measure, speaking generally. It is, however, wholly without application to Shaftesbury. He was intensely religious in the true signification of being possessed and guided by a sense of the Divine supremacy and of human responsibility. This consciousness was the determining influence of his life. In writing to his young friend at University, he says (*Letters*, p. 4) that when the improvement of our minds and the advancement of our reason is what we aim at to fit us for a perfecter, more rational, and worthier service of God, we can have no scruples whether or no the work be an acceptable one to Him. But where neither our duty to mankind, nor obedience to our Creator is anyway the end or object of our studies or exercises, be they ever so curious or exquisite, they may be justly styled vain. Shaftesbury was not faint in his vision of God, but he was, as Stephen points

out (English Thought, II., p. 25), inimical to the debased conception of deity as found in primitive religious teaching, both Jewish and Christian, as it still obtained in his day. In this respect Shaftesbury's insistence is not yet superfluous. But it is not correct when Stephen says elsewhere (Free-thinking, p. 256), that a belief in God is an essential part of Shaftesbury's system, and that such belief means a perception of harmonious order (Stephen, English Thought, II., p. 25). Shaftesbury's avowed aim is to show that the inseparableness of God and ethics, as popularly believed, does not exist, and one can, therefore, have a perception of the moral relationship of the universe without perception or even thought of God. Shaftesbury is a firm believer in God. To him God is a reality and a palpably moving spirit. In consonance with the other deists he may have held theoretically to the distance of the Deity in certain respects from His universe, but this Deity was certainly not distant from Shaftesbury himself, as far as his consciousness was concerned.

Shaftesbury maintains the existence of a complete severance between religion and ethics. This is implied in his teaching of the substantive existence of goodness as a universal harmony by which even God is determined as a moral being. Shaftesbury anticipated our familiar principle that men act and develop conduct before they speculate, and that accordingly, as he says (Characteristics, I., p. 266), "It will hardly be questioned that it is possible for a creature capable of using reflection to have a liking or dislike of moral actions, and consequently a sense of right and wrong, before such time as he may have any settled notion of a God." One may continue without any theistic belief and yet discover a high opinion of virtue. (*Ibid.*, 275.) Indeed, so certain is the precedence of ethics to religion, that the religious conscience depends for its efficacy upon the natural conscience (*Ibid.*, p. 305). So Shaftesbury says that, the love of God is best attained not by speculation and philosophy, but by moral practice, and love of mankind, and a study of their interests. True zeal for God, or religion, must be supported by real love for mankind (Letters, pp. 8, 9). In other words, it is Shaftesbury's teaching that ethics is the threshold to religion.

Religion, therefore, according to Shaftesbury, is not essential to ethics, but may be helpful, and so supplementary.



Just how the influence is exerted and effectuated he does not say. He is no clearer on this point and no more helpful than Schleiermacher, who, discussing the same problem in his "Discourses on Religion," leaves us hazy as to a solution. Shaftesbury says (*Characteristics*, I., p. 270), that, "If religion creates a belief that the ill passions no less than their consequent actions are the objects of a deity's animadversion, 'tis certain that such a belief must prove a seasonable remedy against vice and be in a particular manner advantageous to virtue," and that thus "virtue finds completion in piety" (*Ibid.*, 280). But he fails to recognize that from the standpoint of his own conception of virtue the result of such piety would not be virtuous, although it might be religious. Even if such a religious result might be termed ethical, it would be impossible to see how it would imply a single step in the direction of virtue as conceived in Shaftesbury's system. Virtue on religious soil is submission to Divine will. In Shaftesbury's sense it is spontaneous response and adaptation to the appeal of a harmony universal. So, although he does not disclaim religion and appraises it as supplementary to ethics, he virtually discards it by failing to bring it into logical consistency with his ethical system. Kant's adoption of religion as a regulative principle is far more valuable, although logically scrutinized is not much more tenable.

## CLASSIFICATION OF SHAFTESBURY

G. We come now, finally, in our presentation of Shaftesbury's ethical teaching to its most difficult problem, as to its classification among ethical principles. Shall we call him hedonistic or intuitionist? We find nowhere more than incidental reference to the subject. And yet it is interesting and important. A cursory reading of our author leaves one at the close thereof confused as to what term may properly be applied to him. As one proceeds in the text he finds himself constantly vacillating, now inclining to the hedonistic position, anon to the more rigorous ethical standard.

A decision of our question requires not only a consideration of Shaftesbury's expressed opinions, account must also be taken of the evident spirit with which his writings are in-

spired and permeated. In his more formal, purely ethical writings, there is a decided balance in favor of those who would claim Shaftesbury for hedonism. Goodness is commonly interpreted in terms of pleasure and happiness; as, for instance, "To have the natural affections (such as are founded in love, complacency, good-will, and in a sympathy with the kind or species) is to have the chief means and power of self-enjoyment. To want these is certain misery and ill" (*Characteristics*, I., p. 293). "The natural affections being the only means which can procure a constant series or succession of the mental enjoyments, are the only means which can procure a certain and solid happiness" (*Ibid.*, 294). Shaftesbury everywhere identifies virtue with pleasure. "Where perfect beauty is, there alone can be perfect enjoyment" (*Regimen*, pp. 59, 91). He even urges the superior claim of pleasure when he says, "Every creature should seek its good and not its misery" (*Ibid.*, 92), in which goodness is synonymous with happiness. These teachings in support of hedonism might be increased to greater length to place Shaftesbury in the ranks of the school of hedonists. There is, however, another aspect of the matter.

While Shaftesbury abounds in interpretations of virtue in terms of pleasure and the like, in none of these is he as emphatic and impressive as when he presents morality in its intuitional phase. "In the characters or pictures of manners which the mind of necessity figures to itself and carries about with it the heart cannot possibly remain neutral, but constantly takes part one way or another" (*Characteristics*, I., p. 252). "There is a power in harmony proportion and beauty of every kind which naturally captivates the heart" (*Ibid.*, II., 174). "Integrity, justice, faith, or anything which is the part of a man as he is a man, is his only end and not pleasure. He who follows pleasure as his end knows not what he follows. He who follows virtue as his end knows what he follows" (*Regimen*, 50). Shaftesbury's intuitionalism is implied in his virtual discarding of religion from the ethical standpoint, and assigning to it a mere supplementary and subordinate, although not indispensable, position. We see it further exemplified, even more emphatically, in his avowed opposition to virtue on any ground of utility. In a letter to Lord Somers (*Regimen*, 402) he pities him if he cannot find good attractive for its own sake. He speaks with

like contempt of all whose virtue is, as he would call it, a commercial bargaining. "Those who can be conscious of doing no good but what they are frightened or bribed into, can make but a sorry account of it" (*Ibid.*, 345). "Nothing is truly pleasing or satisfactory but what is acted disinterestedly, generously, and freely" (*Ibid.*). "The certain way to make the most of life is to do the most good, and that the most generously, throwing aside selfishness and mercenariness" (*Ibid.*, 346). Shaftesbury says of himself, "The greatest part of what I do in the world is not because I hope anything, but because I think I must be doing" (*Ibid.*, 299). In other words, he finds an inherent compulsion in duty or virtue. This attitude of his may be seen to attain its highest dignity and confirmation when he urges virtue not only apart from thought or expectation of reward, but even where it may entail not only absence of pleasure but even possibility of pain. "It is diviner," says he (*Characteristics*, 27), "to do good where it may be thought inglorious than for glory's sake." If now, with these clear-cut teachings, one takes account, as has been maintained should be done, of the spirit of Shaftesbury, there will remain no doubt as to the purity of his intuitionism, at least in its intention. In his less formal teachings, as in the *Philosophical Regimen*, where we see mirrored, as it were, the inner life of the man, we experience a very palpable spirit of moral earnestness to which virtue in its unclothed beauty wields a powerful appeal into consonance with which he struggles hard to bring himself. Further, be it noted that while Shaftesbury commonly places the appeal of virtue on its own basis without other reference to pleasure than as a natural result of virtuous action, he rarely inculcates virtue for the sake of pleasure. Indeed, it is evident that when reference is made to pleasure as concomitant of virtue, it is for the sake of the virtue and not the reverse. He tells us (*Ibid.*, 67) that there is a necessity for the preservation of virtue. To this end it should be thought to have no quarrel with true interest and self-enjoyment. He is willing to accept happiness as an aid to virtue, but not as a ground therefor. Virtue is to be the supreme concern.

And yet, Shaftesbury's intuitionism does not hold. Theoretically it is valid, practically it does not work. In his discussion "Concerning Virtue or Merit," he discusses the nature of virtue and leaves with the reader the impression

that it is something that needs only be known in order to be done. It does not require the conventional aid of religion, although this may be helpful. It is represented as autonomous or self-enacting. Had Shaftesbury rested the case here it would have redounded to the dignity of his system and placed it squarely on the side of intuitionism. But when he comes to the second part of the same discussion, in Book II., thereof he belies his previous teaching by asking bluntly and plainly, at the very outset, "what obligation there is to virtue, or what reason to embrace it." Thereafter virtue is explained in terms of pleasure. It is presented as synonymous therewith, although he does not, as has been said, urge that one should be guided by the hedonistic motive. A consistent intuitionism would exclude in a discussion of virtue the question of motive. The genuine intuitionist requires no motive. Shaftesbury himself plainly evidenced his consciousness of the weakness or limitation of the intuitional view of virtue when he said (*Characteristics*, I., p. 9), "If the knowing well how to expose any infirmity or vice were sufficient security for the virtue which is contrary, how excellent an age might we be presumed to live in." We are reminded here of the pathetic echo of this conviction on the part of Bishop Butler, whose intended intuitionism also breaks down in his confession with regard to the limitation of the moral consciousness that "Had it strength, as it had right, had it power as it had manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world" (*British Moralists*, I., p. 217). James Martineau, in his "Types of Ethical Theory" (II., pp. 500, 508), mentions this inconsistency in Shaftesbury's system, speaks of it properly as a downward step, and terms it "forgetfulness of prior positions" (*Ibid.*, 510). We do not think that it evidences forgetfulness, but inability to maintain the high position with which the discussion started. So, in characterizing Shaftesbury's system, we should say that in intention it is intuitional, but becomes hedonistic in its realization. And yet, strange to say, Shaftesbury himself is in character a fine exhibition of a man whose virtue may be said to be guided by intuitional promptings. He was better than his teaching. And yet, this teaching may be said to be a tribute to his virtue. So enamoured of the good was he that he conceded to human weakness by providing for the securance of virtue through the added attraction of a hedonistic motive.

## DISCUSSION

### III.

Shaftesbury's merit as ethical teacher is great and manifold. Up to his time morality had been made, as Hunt (Religious Thought, II., 347) has said, "to depend upon the authority of the State, the Church, or the will of God." "The Bible was supposed to determine what was right or wrong" (*Ibid.*, 359). The progress of thought and investigation, and the growth of a liberal spirit would make such basis of morality very insecure. Shaftesbury anticipated this by removing the basis of morality from what might be construed as secondary and placing it in the ultimate constitution of the universe itself. He was the first in English thought, in the novelty and attractiveness of his presentation, to protest against a manufactured morality, whether human or divine. Morality has never been made more august than when Shaftesbury, in his forceful way, made it obligatory even upon God Himself.

Shaftesbury may be credited with having initiated the impulse which led to the popularization of the doctrine of viewing morality *sub specie eterni*. This conception gives dignity to the smallest moral act by ascribing to it a universal relation and significance. Acts may be small but not unimportant. This makes man cooperative with the universe. There is an old traditional Jewish view that man is intended to be and should be in partnership with the deity to realize the possibilities of the universe. Shaftesbury raises man to the higher dignity of partnership with the universe itself, with which, according to his teaching, God Himself must be in harmonious relation.

Shaftesbury has anticipated some of the general convictions of present-day sociological teaching, although his conclusions were reached speculatively instead of by empirical investigation. "There is hardly a single fact in the whole range of sociological knowledge," says Giddings (Elements of Sociology, 232), that does not support the conclusion that the race was social before it was human, and that its social qualities were the chief means of developing its human nature." This is fundamental with Shaftesbury in opposition to Hobbes. The consequent teaching that society must

take precedence, Shaftesbury urged with even greater insistence than Herbert Spencer. "The life of the social organism," says Spencer (*Data of Ethics*, Ch. VIII., Sec. 49), "must, as an end, rank above the lives of its units." But, according to him, this organism is the result of expediency and not of the universal constitution, as with Shaftesbury. "Living together," says Spencer (*Ibid.*), "arose because, on the average, it proved more advantageous to each than living apart." But social integrity with Spencer is essential as contributory to continued individual self-preservation. Accordingly, "the subordination of personal to social welfare is contingent," says he; "it depends on the presence of antagonistic societies. When such cease, the need for sacrifice of private claims to public claims ceases also" (*Ibid.*) Shaftesbury's view is opposite. He also maintains the superior right of the social whole, but subordination of self is not contingent and will not be removed. The individual is incidental, the whole is essential and will have to continue so.

Spencer and modern sociological teaching in general agree that society is not a manufacture but a growth. (cf. Spencer: *Social Organism*, 270.) In this connection he objects to the social conceptions of Plato and Hobbes on the ground of their artificiality. But his conception was forestalled by Shaftesbury and in a more thorough-going, vital way. To Spenced (*Ibid*) there exists scarcely any mutual dependence of parts in the early undeveloped states of society, whereas "in our conception of a social organism we must include all that lower organic existence on which human existence depends" (*Ibid.*, 272). This very inclusion of the lower with the higher characterizes Shaftesbury and in a more thorough-going fashion than with Spencer. While Spencer, as Muirhead has pointed out (*Ethics*, 128, note), holds the doctrine of the social organism with feeble grasp, as though it were an interesting analogy or metaphor, Shaftesbury conceives of it as vital and fundamental. Muirhead says (*Ibid.*, 127) that "for the atomic theory of human nature modern science has substituted the organic." This substitution can properly be first credited to Shaftesbury.

In keeping with this organic social conception is the evolutionary ethical one. This evolutionary ethical conception Shaftesbury also emphasized. "Moral obligation at any particular stage," says Muirhead (*Ethics*, 212), "rests, not

merely on the call to maintain a particular form of moral organization, but to maintain and forward the cause of moral order as a whole." "Duty rests upon a personal interest in a moral order" (*Ibid*). To this Shaftesbury would have given immediate and literal assent. But Shaftesbury's teaching is of broader scope than that of the insistence of evolutionary ethics. For while, as stated by Stephen (*Science of Ethics*, 160), the moral law of evolutionary ethics defines a property of the social tissue, the same law as urged by Shaftesbury bears reference to what he would call the universal tissue.

Shaftesbury's most characteristic doctrine, that which distinguishes him most radically from other ethical writers and makes him to that extent unique, is his inculcation of what he calls the moral sense. This contribution of his to ethical teaching may, however, be required to suffer some detraction and be regarded as having been exaggerated in importance, and accordingly too largely credited. Stephen may be said to have misunderstood and misrepresented it entirely. He interprets it as a "natural tendency to virtue" (*English Thought*, II., 29), and considers it to owe its origination to the influence of the universal harmony just as this same harmony produces in our imagination sense of the beautiful, and in our reason generates philosophy (*Ibid.*, 30). The moral sense of Shaftesbury's teaching is neither a tendency to virtue nor is it produced by the universal harmony. It is a sensitiveness and responsiveness to the good which it recognizes as soon as it confronts it, but is not called into being by it. It is a native endowment natural to man as the harmony it perceives is natural to the universe. But Shaftesbury has not suggested a novelty ethically so much as he has attempted to give philosophic expression and dignity to a familiar fact of universal recognition. We commonly describe our recognition of the good in terms of feeling. We apprehend a certain ethical distinction or frame a definite ethical resolution. When asked for an explanation we naively say that we feel it to be right or wrong, as the case may be. This feeling is what generally dominates our character. Upon this Shaftesbury seized. He overlooked that it is a product and secondary to the more rapid and elusive operation of mental recognition and, giving it a primary position in our inner life, called it under the name of

moral sense that by which goodness is recognized. His procedure is striking, but psychologically incorrect. This opinion finds support in the judgment of Warner Fite that "we should refuse to regard the moral sense as the unanalyzable utterance of a special faculty" (Ethics, 23).

This ought not, however, to be taken to rob Shaftesbury's teaching of moral value. It has high worth, but in another direction. In his attribution of moral apprehension to a moral sense he has given emphasis to a fact of ethical import that is not always recognized by ethical theorists and is not sufficiently familiar to the more practical generality of mankind, and that is, that morality is ultimately determined by feeling and not by intellectual conviction. This is a truth of very ancient recognition. When Socrates says that, to know the right is to do it, there is reason to believe that knowledge implied more than mere intellectual apprehension, and that is the consequent and attendant sensitive experience. Pure intellect is impassive, reason is cold. Neither alone would effect anything in the realm of conduct. The bridge is furnished by the impetus of feeling. The Bible may be construed as having given this forceful expression when it says (Proverbs, IV., 23), "Keep thy heart with all diligence for out of it are the issues of life." This fact of the primacy of feeling, as determining factor in the moral life, is what Shaftesbury may be said to have implied in his teaching of the moral sense.

While Shaftesbury's merit is great in having given philosophical expression and emphasis to a familiar experience, he might have placed us under greater obligation had he indicated, or even intimated, how the moral sense is to be educated. That it is educable he maintained, as has been pointed out. When Plato presented in his republic the method of education for the citizen of the ideal commonwealth he gave due attention to the development of the inner life by requiring, among other things, that careful and extensive attention be given to the matter of right environment. Shaftesbury might have done similarly, and in so doing have achieved more for ethical theory in general, than by the mere inculcation of his moral sense. It would have been, if tenable and effective, a valuable contribution to the furtherance of a scientific ethics.

The genuineness of Shaftesbury's originality has suf-



ferred detracting. Windelband maintains that "the ancient conception of life, in accordance with which morality coincides with the undisturbed unfolding of man's true and natural essence, was directly congenial to Shaftesbury and became the living basis of his thought" (*Hist. of Phil.*, 508). There is room to maintain that Shaftesbury's originality is really not compromised here. His theory is more than one of a mere self-unfolding. It is rather one of a self-adaptation. What Fowler says is more to the point when he suggests (*Shaftesbury*, 98) that Shaftesbury's analogy between art and morals, beauty and virtue, is evidently derived from Plato, while his conviction of man's native sociality and other elements are taken from Aristotle and Plato. Some of the elements which Shaftesbury must have taken from Plato may be found, among others, in the *Protagoras* (p. 110): is not the wiser the fairer?; in the *Gorgias* (p. 95): the good soul is that in which there is harmony and order; in the *Phaedo* (p. 423): where vice is denominated discord and virtue harmony. Shaftesbury's teaching of the absoluteness of beauty and goodness is also Platonic (*Phaedo*, 391). His larger indebtedness to his great master may be found in his probable derivation from him of his insistence upon a universal organism and of the consequent truth of the necessity of a knowledge of the whole for a comprehension of a part. "All nature is akin," says Plato (*Meno*, p. 255), "and there is no difficulty in the soul's eliciting all out of a single recollection," and "Can anyone who does not know virtue know a part of virtue?" (*Ibid.*, 253). Shaftesbury's constant reference to a higher whole as norm of valuation of the particulars of our experience reproduces in some instances with striking similarity the teaching of Plato that those are blind who are deprived of the knowledge of the true being of each thing, and have in their souls no clear pattern, and are unable, as with a painter's eye, to look at the very truth and to that original to repair (*Republic*, Bk. VI., p. 310).

Shaftesbury's reproduction of the platonic identification of virtue and harmony is only natural, according to Palmer (*Field of Ethics*, 94), who says that in general, "Testimony of every sort, gather it where we may, shows that the human mind has always identified, or tended to identify, the field of beauty and the field of goodness." To this may be added that it can be further shown, and this easily, that both in his

idea of the necessity of man's adaptation to the universal harmony and in the evident spirit, as well as in a particular expression of many of his sentiments, Shaftesbury is plainly either a literal reproduction or a refined modification of the spirit and teachings of Stoicism. Even a cursory reading of his "Philosophical Regimen" will inforce this conclusion. The time in which his moral teaching took shape was one of an intense Grecian spirit (Gizycki, 89). His youth had been richly stored with classic knowledge. Latin and Greek were to him like mother tongues. Xenophon and Plato, Epictetus and Aurelius, Horace and Lucian were the companions of his youth and the friends of his life (Herder in Gizycki, 1). He quotes the Stoics frequently and refers to them as "the learned masters" (Char., II., 280), along the line in which he has drawn from them. Many of his opinions and convictions are almost literal reproductions of those of the Stoics. In his exposition of Grecian and Roman Stoicism, Davis (p. 79) says that "their followers were taught to live in harmony with nature, conformably with reason, and the demands of universal good." "Can anything be more desirable," asks Shaftesbury (Char., II., 148), "than to follow nature?" "True rational life (which with man is the only true life) is when the will is subject to reason" (Regimen, 254). "By freedom from our passions and low interests we are reconciled to the goodly order of the universe" (Char., II., 148). This harmony with the goodly order of the universe was, as has been shown, the main message of Shaftesbury's teaching. This harmony was to him virtue, as it was to the Stoics, and this virtue happiness to him as to them. Shaftesbury himself, in the genuineness and loftiness of his character, is an impressive exemplification of the stoic spirit incorporated in action. Accordingly, it should be said that Shaftesbury's real originality lies in his teaching of the moral sense, although this may be open to the interpretation, as has been pointed out, of being a dignified philosophical phrasing of a commonplace familiar fact of the life of the feelings. And yet, even this does not necessarily imply a discreditable detraction. A more serious one may be made with reference to his repetition of the Socratic mistake of identifying knowledge with virtue. Such identification is true only to a limited extent. It is true of a Socrates as of a Shaftesbury, but not of mankind generally. In this particular aspect of his teaching

Shaftesbury's ethics lacks the quality of scientific requirement. Shaftesbury may be found to err further in his view of man's nature in his excessive generalization on the side of man's goodness, as Hobbes erred on the side of man's wickedness. It is truer to say that all men are no particular thing morally, but merely possibilities for good or evil.

Another qualification of Shaftesbury's originality may be found in his ethical requirement of submission to the world-order which, as Gizycki has pointed out (*Philosophie*, 198), is the summation of all religion. He has virtually narrowed and carried over into the field of ethics a conception that properly belongs to and which he may unconsciously have taken from the realm of religion. Religion is an attempt at harmonization with the world-order as expressive of a God. Shaftesbury's system makes the same demand for ethics, but omits God.

Finally, the most fundamental criticism that can be passed upon Shaftesbury's system refers not to its originality, but to the value of its ethical principle. If that is ethical which, according to him, is harmonious with the whole, by what criterion can one tell when such harmonization has been attained. With regard to this important demand Shaftesbury has left us without other aid than the moral sense, which is insufficient.

And yet, Shaftesbury's greatness as a moral teacher stands. He saw that ethics must not stand in independent isolation as a department of life, but must express one's attitude to the world as a whole. He thus gave the subject philosophic formulation and contributed towards making it scientific by relieving it of arbitrary aspects. Robertson in his "Introduction to the Characteristics" (p. 45), says that the "Characteristics" can still hold its own with most of the books with which it competed in its generation. This is inadequate praise. Mackintosh (*Dissertation*, p. 117) is nearer the truth when he says of the "Inquiry concerning Virtue," that it is "unquestionably entitled to a place in the first rank of English moral philosophy." Not only can Shaftesbury hold his own with any of the theorists of his day, not only is he superior to most of them, but he does not suffer in the value of his ethical writing in comparison with writers even of the present day. There is justification for venturing the opinion that time will only heighten his im-

portance and broaden and strengthen his position in the general esteem. This opinion finds support in Hettner, who says (*Geschichte*, p. 172): "Seine Reize sind ewig neu. Unsere Gegenwart thut sehr Unrecht, ihn ausser acht zu lassen." "Wir haben alle Ursache wieder zu seinen Schriften zuruck-zu kehren" (*Ibid.*, 187).

Shaftesbury was an exceptional man. His teachings are exponent of his character. This may be extensively illustrated. An impressive exemplification may be found in his exalted unselfishness, as expressed with regard to the relation of author and reader, when he says, "Should I have the good fortune to raise the masterly spirit of just criticism in my readers and exalt them ever so little above the lazy, timorous, over-modest, or resigned state in which the generality of them remain, though by this very spirit I myself might possibly meet my doom, I should, however, abundantly congratulate with myself on these my low flights, be proud of having plumed the arrows of better wits, and furnished artillery or ammunition of any kind to those powers to which I myself had fallen a victim. Fungar vice cotis: I will play the part of a whetstone, Horace *De arte poet*, 304. (*Char.*, II., 313.)

Character is coming increasingly to be the center of human interest and emphasis. This will only redound to a growth in interest in Shaftesbury's teachings. He was unusual in qualification for such teaching. Libby (*Journal of Psychol.*, XII., 458) characterizes him as an aesthetic mind strongly interested in moral and religious questions. He was, what is more to the point, an intensely moral man, profoundly interested in moral speculation. ✓ The ethical man is certainly the best ethical expositor. Plato (*Phaedrus*, 555) says: "He who has become corrupted is not easily carried out of this world to the sight of beauty in the other," the meaning of which is that an unethical man is not a good ethical teacher. Conversely, Shaftesbury was well fitted for his task. His teachings welled from and are freighted with intense moral conviction. He will, therefore, because of what he was, attract an increasing attention to what he taught, while his teachings will enjoy a widening influence because of the quality of their author.

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